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Housework, Wages, and the Division of Housework Time

for Employed Spouses
By JONI HERSCH AND LESLIE S. STRATTON*

While the popular press may have declared housework passe with the advent of
the two-income household (see "Housework
is Obsolescent" by Barbara Ehrenreich

as the share of housework time contributed
by the husband. The results indicate that
husbands do less housework than their wives
as their relative earnings and hours spent in
the labor market increase.

[1993] for one such example), the facts indicate that housework continues to consume a
substantial amount of time, particularly for
women. While estimates vary widely depending on the sample examined and the
methods used to generate the information,

I. The Effect of Housework on Wages

Time spent engaged in housework may
affect market wages in a variety of ways. It
may reduce wages indirectly by affecting the
accumulation of human capital. Individuals
who anticipate shorter (or less intense)
employment spells due to greater home responsibilities will undertake less humancapital investment. Such individuals may ob-

representative values of housework time
range around 6-14 hours per week for men
and 20-30 hours for women. Since wages
are likely to be influenced both directly and
indirectly by the time and effort devoted to

other activities, and since gender differences in household responsibilities are significant and often assumed to be a driving
force behind gender earnings differentials,
decisions regarding the overall amount of
time spent on housework and the division of
that time within the household are important ones. The goal of this paper is to shed
some light on these allocation decisions.
We begin by discussing the various methods by which time and effort spent on
housework may affect wages and summarize
the available empirical evidence. Overall,
the empirical evidence indicates that time
spent on housework has a negative effect on
wages, an effect which is most pronounced
for women. We next examine the amount of
time spent on housework and the division of
that time between working spouses. To do
so, we draw upon the human-capital literature and the bargaining literature to construct simple regression equations for time
spent on housework by each spouse as well

tain less education before entering the job
market and may seek jobs providing less
on-the-job training once actively participating. In addition, employers may be less likely
to hire or to promote individuals whom they
expect to have shorter or discontinuous
working lives. Any investments by firms in
such individuals, even hiring costs, are less
likely to be recouped. Since wages are higher
for workers with more years of work experience, training, and job seniority, and since
women have significantly lower values of
these human-capital characteristics, the
weaker performance of women in the labor
market relative to men is in this way related
to differences in household responsibilities.
Housework may also directly affect earnings by limiting energy and effort. The more
time and effort expended on housework, the
less time and effort are available for per-

forming market work (e.g., Gary Becker,
1985). Although men average more hours

* Hersch: Department of Economics and Finance,
University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071; Stratton:
Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.

than women in paid employment, full-time
employed women spend more total time on
housework and market work than do men.
The physical fatigue induced by their greater
total work load may make women less productive in the labor market. In addition, the
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timing of household responsibilities may
make schedules less flexible, so that market
work may be disrupted for those women
with greater household responsibilities. Such
individuals may restrict their job search to

effect of housework time on wages for husbands, but the magnitude of the effect for
wives is about 50-percent larger than for
husbands. The difference in the magnitude
of the effect of housework on wages bepositions entailing shorter commutes or altween wives and husbands may in part be
lowing greater flexibility in scheduling.
due to the relatively small amount of time
Estimates from wage equations which inspent on housework by the husbands. The
clude time spent on housework provide emeffect of housework on wages may increase
pirical support for the existence of a direct
as time spent on housework increases, since
negative relation between housework and
at low levels of housework time individuals
wages. This relation is most pronounced for
may be expending too little effort to be
women. Hersch (1991a) finds a negative efnoticeable or may be engaged only in activifect on wages of time spent on housework
ties they enjoy. The disparity in the distribufor women, controlling for human-capital
tion of time spent on housework between
characteristics, number of children, and
wives and husbands is considerable. In
marital status. This effect persists (albeit
Hersch and Stratton (1993) we find that
with reduced significance) when controls forthis disparity is responsible for a significant
working conditions are included. Simultanecomponent of the gender wage differential.
ous-equation estimates of a wage-housework system, which recognizes that houseII. Time Spent on Housework
work time is jointly determined with wage,
yield similar results (Hersch, 1991b), as do
To investigate the amount of time spent
instrumental-variables estimates correcting
on housework and the division of that time
for the endogeneity of housework (Hersch
between working spouses, we use data from
and Stratton, 1993).
the Michigan Panel Study of Income DyAlthough cross-sectional results indicate
namics for white, married workers aged
an inverse relation between wages and
20-64, from the years 1979-1987, excluding
housework time, this relation may be due to
observations from the year 1982 in which
a correlation between time spent on househousework information is not available. Inwork and unobserved individual characterisformation about time spent on housework is
tics, such as "market ability" or "ambition,"
obtained as the response to the question,
that have negative effects on wages. We
"About how much time do (you or your
investigated this possibility by estimating
spouse) spend on housework in an average
fixed-effects wage equations for married
week? I mean time spent cooking, cleaning,
workers (Hersch and Stratton, 1993). The
and doing other work around the house." In
fixed-effects estimates control for the effectsevery year but 1985, the husband responded
of unobserved individual-specific characterfor both himself and his wife, suggesting
istics on housework time and thereby help
that the large disparity between husband's
isolate the direct effect of housework on
and wife's housework time is not solely due
earnings that is attributable to factors such
to wives overstating their housework time.
as effort. Consistent with the evidence from
The analysis is restricted to working spouses
cross-sectional estimates, the fixed-effects
in order to minimize reported housework
results indicate a negative relation between
time inconsistencies that may arise from the
housework time and wages for women. This
tendency of any task to fill the amount of
relation is smaller in magnitude than the
time available.
cross-sectional estimates, but it is still fairly
Table 1 presents mean values of houselarge and statistically significant.
work time for working husbands and wives.
While a number of studies indicate a
Consistent with all other evidence, we find
negative effect of housework on wages
large disparities in time spent on housework
for women, the evidence for men is mixed.
between husbands and wives, even though
Hersch and Stratton (1993) find a negative
we restrict our analysis to households in
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TABLE 1-AvERAGE VALUES AND SHARES
OF HOUSEWORK TIME

FOR EMPLOYED SPOUSES

Average Number

value Husband's of

Sample Husbands Wives share observations
Overall 7.36 19.66 0.27 6,409
(6.81) (10.97) (0.18)
No children 6.86 16.27 0.29 2,435
(6.39) (9.12) (0.18)

Children 7.66 21.74 0.25 3,974
(7.04) (11.48) (0.18)
Both spouses 7.37 17.32 0.29 2,855
employed (6.45) (9.18) (0.18)
full-time

which both spouses are employed. Overall,
the husbands average about 7 hours per
week on housework, while the wives average
around 20 hours. This differential persists
within households in which both spouses
are employed full-time, with men averaging
7 hours per week on housework and women
averaging 17 hours. The differential increases in the presence of children. The
housework time of employed wives increases by over 5 hours when children are
present, whereas the impact on husbands'
time is less than 1 hour.
III. Division of Housework Time
Between Wives and Husbands

Finding that time spent on housework
indeed appears to have a direct negative
effect on wages and that the average time
spent on housework differs significantly between husbands and wives, we now turn to
the question of how housework time is determined and allocated within the family.
Predictions of how time spent on housework will be allocated between the husband
and wife can be derived from both humancapital theory and from bargaining models.
The human-capital argument is that gains
from specialization and exchange will lead
to one member of the household specializing in home production and the other specializing in market work. While humancapital theory alone does not imply that

women will specialize in home production,
it is frequently argued that, even if a husband and wife initially have equal market
ability, childbearing will lead to development of different skills, making it optimal
for women to specialize in home production

and men to specialize in market work (e.g.,
Becker, 1981).
Bargaining models examine how decisions
are made in a long-term relationship, such
as a marriage, in which transactions costs
are high (e.g., Marilyn Manser and Murray
Brown, 1980; Marjorie B. McElroy and Mary
Jean Horney, 1981). The bargaining power
of each spouse is related to his or her
next-best alternative (the "threat point").
Since husbands typically have higher market
wages than their spouses, their bargaining
position is likely to be stronger than their
wives', since they are more readily able to
afford to purchase in the market many of
the services provided by a wife. Assuming
that housework is not engaged in voluntarily, this stronger bargaining position of husbands may lead to the observed greater
share of housework time of women.
To investigate whether housework time
can be explained by factors recognized in
the economics literature, we estimate three
housework equations to explain the husband's share of total housework time, the
husband's housework time, and the wife's
housework time. While the share of housework time corresponds most closely to the
household allocation decision, finding an increase in the husband's share (for instance)
does not identify whether the increase in
his share resulted from an increase in his
housework time or from a decrease in his
wife's time. For this analysis the estimates
from all three equations are required.
Both bargaining and human-capital models suggest that a common set of observable
characteristics explain housework time, although for somewhat different reasons. The
individual with relatively higher earnings is
expected to contribute less time to housework, either because that individual has a
comparative advantage in market work, or
because that spouse's bargaining position is
stronger. Thus we expect an inverse relation
between the husband's share of household
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labor income and his time (and share of
time) on housework. We expect a negative
relation between own labor-market hours
and own housework time, and a positive
relation between own housework time and
spouse's labor-market hours.
We control for both spouses' education
with dummy variables equal to 1 if the individual has less than a high-school education
or greater than a high-school education (the
omitted category is high-school graduate).
Education affects earning opportunities and
thereby each individual's threat point or
comparative advantage in household versus
market work. Education may also proxy for
attitudes. For instance, opinion surveys suggest that education is positively related to
egalitarian household values.
Children enter the specification through
three separate variables indicating the number of children under age 6, aged 6-12, and
aged 13-18. This level of detail can be
justified on two counts. First, to the extent
that wives have a comparative advantage in
child-raising, this comparative advantage
would seem to depend not only on the presence of children, but on their ages as well.
Second, as children get older they may
themselves perform significant housework.
We control for cohort effects with a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the husband
was born before 1950. The purpose of this
variable is to capture changing social norms.
It is expected to have a negative effect on
the husband's share of housework time. Finally, since there may be regional differences in tastes or values, we include a
dummy variable equaling 1 for residence in
the South.
Table 2 presents variable means and the
regression results. The dependent variable
in column 2 is the husband's share of total
housework time, in column 3 it is the husband's housework time, and in column 4 it
is the wife's housework time.
The share equation indicates that the
husband's share of housework time is significantly lower when he contributes a
greater share of labor income. By looking at
the housework-time equations for the husband and wife, we see that his lower share
is due to both a decrease in the amount of

TABLE 2-INDIVIDUAL AND HUSBAND'S SHARE
OF HOUSEWORK TIME

Housework

Independent Mean Husband's hours

variable [SD] share Husband's Wife's
Husband's share 0.67 -0.20 -3.54 9.06

of labor income [0.16] (8.60) (4.16) (7.19)
Combined labor 40,629 -2x 10-7 -lx10 -5 -2x10 5
income [22,427] (2.03) (2.60) (3.14)
Husband's labor- 2,167.3 -6 x 10-4 1 X 10-3
market hours [531.8] (3.49) (4.18)

Wife's labor- 1,576.9 3 x 10-4 -2 x 10-3
market hours [621.7] (0.21) (7.56)
Husband's share of 0.59 -0.11

labor-market hours [0.13] (4.14)
Education:

Less than high 0.11 -0.029 -0.79 0.85

school, husband [0.32] (3.82) (2.65) (1.92)
More than high 0.52 0.38 0.17 -1.65

school, husband [0.50] (7.45) (0.84) (5.65)
Less than high 0.11 -0.005 - 0.07 1.45

school, wife [0.32] (0.67) (0.24) (3.41)
More than high 0.44 0.02 0.29 -0.89

school, wife [0.50] (4.04) (1.47) (3.05)
Children:

Age 13-18 0.24 -0.02 -0.14 1.84

[0.54] (5.38) (0.87) (7.56)
Age 6-12 0.51 0.007 0.66 2.19

[0.81] (2.65) (6.31) (14.07)
Age

<6

0.37

0.004

1.29

2.89

[0.63] (1.02) (9.03) (13.60)
Older cohort 0.55 -0.03 -0.23 2.46

[0.50] (6.85) (1.21) (8.87)
South

0.33 -0.03 -0.75 0.43
[0.47] (5.77) (4.14) (1.62)

Constant

0.48

10.61

12.62

(43.76) (10.61) (11.07)

Adjusted R2: 0.12 0.04 0.19
Note: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

the husband's housework time and an increase in his wife's. The husband's share of
housework is smaller in households with
greater combined labor income, but as the

housework equations show, both spouses'
housework time is inversely related to combined labor income. The share equation thus
indicates that the husband's time is reduced
proportionately more than his wife's.
The predicted inverse relation between
the husband's share of labor-market hours
and his share of housework is also confirmed empirically. Own housework time is
inversely related to own labor-market hours.
However, the wife's housework time is posi-
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tively related to her husband's labor-market
hours, while her husband's is unaffected by
her labor-market hours. Thus the reduction
in the husband's share of housework time is
due both to an increase in his wife's time
and a decrease in his own time on housework.

which both spouses are employed full time.
The principle difference is that combined
labor income ceases to be a significant determinant of husband's share of housework
or of own housework time.
IV. Concluding Remarks

The share equation indicates that husbands provide a greater share of the household labor time when either spouse has

We find that wives do more housework
than their husbands, in part because they
more than a high-school education, and a
earn less on average than their husbands.
lesser share when the husband has less than
Further, their greater time spent on housea high-school education. The husband's
work exacerbates this earnings differential,
share is more in households in which either
both indirectly and directly. The anticipaspouse has greater than a high-school edution of greater household responsibilities
cation because his wife does less housefor women over their lifetime leads to difwork, not because he does more. The lesser
ferent investment decisions or outcomes
share done by husbands in households in
than for men of equal market ability. Thus
which he has less than a high-school educawomen earn less on average than men betion is due to both a decrease in his housecause they invest less in the human capital
work time and an increase in his wife's.
necessary to increase earnings. But even
The effect of children in the household is
after controlling for gender differences in
approximately as expected. The husband's
human capital and other wage-related charshare of housework time in households with
acteristics, time spent on housework has
older children is lower, which results from
been found to have a direct negative effect
an increase in his wife's housework time
on earnings, an effect which is most prowith no change in his own. Both spouses
nounced for women.
increase their housework time when there
Thus allocation decisions that result in
are children under age 12 in the household.
women doing more housework than men set
In this case, even the husband's share rises.
up a vicious cycle, a cycle which is hard to
The variables entered specifically to capbreak. Only the evidence indicating that
ture attitudinal differences identified signif- younger women are spending less time on
icant effects. Husbands in the older cohort
housework and more time in the labor marprovide a smaller share of the total houseket suggests that the gender difference in
work time. This is due to an increase in
work histories and housework time may be
their wives' housework time; the husbands'
diminishing. Such changes will further detime is not affected by cohort. Since wives in crease the gender wage gap, leading to still
this sample are on average two years
greater equity in the allocation of houseyounger than their husbands, this suggests
work.
that younger women are spending less time
on housework. There is also evidence of
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